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Introduction 
Despite the fact that their consumption is not, by their nature, harmful to people, transactions of some goods 
are prohibited by law. Key examples include endangered species or derivatives of them. In these cases, 
“production”, not consumption, is the main focus of the law implemented; to try to increase production of 
these goods is considered damaging to nature or human society. 
Although prohibited, the purchase of the goods in question is still possible to some extent through 
“illegal markets” or “black markets”. It is extremely difficult to completely wipe out such markets from 
society, especially in developing nations, despite the efforts of governments and other authorities. In general, 
it is assumed that the black market would shrink if legal trade were prohibited, since this would reduce 
demand for the goods and make laundering impossible. Thus, a trade ban is thought to be a useful way of 
reducing illegal production. This assumption provides the basic case for banning trade, or for not lifting 
trade bans. 
CITES (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora) is the main 
multilateral framework legal framework aiming at preventing species extinction, banning trade of those 
species that are listed in CITES Appendix I. However, it is pointed out that the CITES trade ban is not 
always effective in protecting threatened species. For example, according to 'tSas-Rolfes (2000), the ban 
seemed to work for protecting African elephants, but it failed to stop the extinction of rhino species such as 
black rhino, because it sharply raised the price in the black market and boosted poaching. That is, a trade 
ban may have adverse effects, far from the desirable ones expected, and illegal production (i.e., poaching) 
may not always decline under a trade ban. It could, on the contrary, increase1.  
In the literature in terms of economic theory, Bergstrom (1990) shows in a simple supply and demand 
model that reducing legal supply of elephant tusks and rhino horns could increase poaching. Barbier and 
Swanson (1990) and Heltberg (2001) also point out that a trade ban might be ineffective, since it could 
stimulate the illegal trade through increasing the incentive for poachers, using a model where the demand 
for ivory declines by the introduction of the ban.  
Fischer (2004) gives a microfoundation for considering the effects of a trade ban. In addition, Fischer 
neatly includes laundering activity, which is crucial in considering the effect of lifting the ban. With this 
inclusion of laundering, Fischer links the legal and illegal markets and deals with the interaction between the 
two markets. The result is that a trade ban reduces poaching where laundering is present, and will minimize 
poaching if it can be assumed that other conditions remain unchanged. That is, a trade ban fails only if 
laundering would not occur under legal trade. 
However, laundering might be inevitable under legal trade, especially in a commodity in great demand 
                                            
1 For the detail of these facts, see Onuma (2006).  
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like rhino horn. In the rhino horn case, the CITES trade ban was not successful. Thus, whether a trade ban is 
effective may not be determined by the question of whether laundering would occur in legal trade. A trade 
ban may still fail even if there is laundering under legal trade. This research aims at clarifying this point, 
regarding the legal and illegal markets as being interdependent. 
In Fischer’s analysis, the two markets are kept virtually separate; there exist two groups of people, one 
consisting of completely immoral people who purchase goods from the black market whenever the price 
there is lower than that in the legal market. The other consists of completely moral people, who never resort 
to the black market. Thus, the two markets interact only when the two market prices are identical, or when 
launderers act as intermediaries between the two markets. 
However, it might not be realistic to think that the legal and illegal markets are separate. There may be 
many people who resort to the black market if the price there is relatively low, but who abide by the law and 
purchase from the legal market if the price difference between the markets is small enough. 
Based on this understanding, this paper provides a simple general equilibrium model in which both 
legal and illegal markets exist interdependently, and examines whether a trade ban is effective in preventing 
the endangered species from becoming extinct.  
 
The Model 
We assume an economy where the transaction of a commodity is either completely prohibited or permitted 
only if it is certified by the authorities. We call the former case a “trade ban”. However, in each case there 
exists a black market, where the goods are illegally traded. The goods are produced by illegal activities such 
as poaching. Let us denote the illegal output by X and its price in the black market by PB. We assume a 
representative producer who maximizes his profit defined by, as in the literature, 
 
10  , ≤≤−= rCXrPBXπ  . 
 
Here r represents the rate of the output that is not confiscated by the authorities, and C is the cost of illegal 
production. 1-r, which is the rate of confiscation, is a proxy for the efforts of the authorities to eradicate 
illegal trade and production.  
 At the same time, we assume that the cost of illegal production C is dependent only on X as C=C(X) with 
C'>0,C''>0. Thus, the producer's profit maximization leads to rPB=C'.  
 On the other hand, we assume that there is a representative launderer. Fischer (2004) characterizes 
laundering behavior as a launderer buying black-market goods and laundering them for subsequent sale in 
the legal market. The authorities detect this laundering, and confiscate a part of the goods that the launderer 
tries to sell in the legal market. Let (1-φ) be the rate of confiscation from laundering. So φH represents the 
supply from the launderer to the legal market. G(H) denotes the cost of laundering behavior, with 
G'>0,G''>0. So the launderer's profit πH must be defined by φPLH-G(H)-PBH.  
 Consumers gain utility from the goods in question. There is no difference for each consumer between the 
goods from the black market and from the government. That is, legal goods and illegal goods are perfect 
substitutes. However, each consumer feels more or less morally guilty if he or she purchases illegal goods. 
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Let y and z express the quantity of legal and illegal goods purchased, respectively. The net utility to 
consumers is represented by 
 
,)()(),,( zzPyPzyUzyV BL αα −+−+=  αα ≤≤0  
 
where U represents the utility gained from consuming the goods and PL the price of goods in the legal 
market. We assume U'>0 and U''<0. On the other hand, αz is the disutility that arises due to the purchase of 
illegal goods. We call this disutility “moral pain” and refer to α as the moral pain coefficient. We assume 
that U is identical across consumers, but that α differs across the same consumers. The number of 
population with α is denoted by f(α) with ∫ =α αα0 .1)( df  A consumer's behavior is described by the 
following expression:  
zzPyPzyU BLzy α−+−+ )()(max ,  . 
Three types of consumers are possible: consumers who purchase only legal goods, consumers who purchase 
only illegal goods, and consumers who are indifferent between legal and illegal goods. We refer the third 
type of consumers “marginal moralists”, since they move to the black market if the price difference between 
legal and illegal markets expands even slightly.  
 
Market Equilibrium 
Let Y and Z express aggregate demand for legal and illegal goods, depending on PL and PB. We can show 
that  
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These properties come from the role of marginal moralists.  
Legal supply from the authority is Y . In this economy, the market equilibrium is expressed by  
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where PL , PB, X, and H are determined endogenously, given Y , r and φ.  
 
Two Policy Measures 
The authority has two policy instruments to control illegal production. One is to change the confiscation 
efforts in the illegal market and with regard to laundering, i.e., changing r and φ. The other is also changing 
450
5.2. Impacts of National Policies and International Institutions on Forest Use Chapter 5 
 
the level of legal supply Y . Investigation of a trade ban is mainly related with the latter instrument.  
 
A Trade Ban 
Under the above model, a trade ban is characterized as 0=Y  so that H=0 in the equilibrium. We are 
interested in the level of X under 0=Y  and that under 0>Y . Thus, X can be expressed by X(Y ). We 
compare X(0) with X(Y ). We say that a trade ban should not be lifted or a trade should be banned if 
 
0  ),()0( >∀< YYXX  . 
 
On the other hand, if it holds for some Y  that )()0( YXX >  and that level of Y  is feasible for the 
authority, a trade ban should be lifted.  
 
Result without Laundering 
If laundering is not possible, that is, if H=0 at any level of Y , then we have  
 
0  ),()0( >∀> YYXX  . 
 
In this case, a trade ban maximizes illegal production, so the ban should be lifted. However, the result 
changes considerably if we include the aspect of laundering.  
 
Result with Laundering 
Let us suppose that laundering occurs, i.e., H>0 at any level of Y .  
We can show that there exists a TY  such that  
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This relationship is depicted in Figure 1. From this property, we can say that, with laundering, trade bans can 
become effective if legal supply is sufficiently small, and that a ban has a desirable effect because illegal 
production is worse under the supply. In this case, lifting a trade ban might worsen the situation, so that it 
should be maintained. Only if there is sufficient legal supply is it appropriate to open up the legal market. 
We call TY  a “threshold” in the sense that it divides a legal supply into either harmful or effective with 
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respect to reducing illegal production.  
 
A Sufficient Condition for a Trade Ban to be Successful.  
We do not know the exact level of the threshold legal supply. However, we can give a sufficient condition 
for a legal supply to be less than the threshold. The condition is:  
 
HY )1( φ−≤  . 
 
That is, if the legal supply is small enough to be less than the confiscated laundered goods H)1( φ− , then 
it is judged that the legal supply is strictly less than the threshold TY , so that a trade ban should not be lifted 
or the ban should be shifted in this case. 
 According to our results, the CITES trade ban on ivory trade that was enforced in 1989 is judged a success 
if the actual φ then was less than 0.8. For, in the 1980s, it is estimated that about 80% of ivory trade was in 
fact illegal and laundered2. Under this estimation, HY φ25.0= . In this case, HY )1( φ−≤ is equivalent 
to 8.0≤φ . That is, if more than one out of five laundered goods were confiscated before the enforcement 
of the ban, we can say that the ban was effective for reducing the poaching of elephants.  
 
A Policy Mix to Discourage Incentives for Illegal Producer and Launderer 
To increase confiscation efforts is not always desirable. The increasing efforts have desirable effects if dX/dr 
and dX/dφ are positive, implying that illegal production declines. Also, dπi/dr and dπi/dφ should be positive, 
which means that incentives for illegal producers and launderers decrease. However, this is not always the 
case, as can be seen from the following results.  
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where both θι and vt and wt are positive values that depend on the functional forms. On the other hand, 
L and εε B are the price elasticities of demand in the black and legal markets, respectively. As can be seen 
from these properties, if the price elasticity is low enough, then there can be an adverse effect. 
                                            
2 For example, see p.51 in Barbier et al. (1990). 
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 However, let us consider the following policy mix under a legal supply: let us raise the rate of confiscation 
directed at laundering by d(-φ)>0. Note that increasing the efforts means to reduce φ. On the other hand, 
legal supply is increased by Hd(-φ)>0. This policy focused on the detection of laundering will reduce both 
the illegal production and the producer's profit. Moreover, it will decrease the launderer’s profit. That is, 
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As we have seen before, the effects of detecting laundering are not definitive, so that it could be harmful. 
But by mixing this detection of laundering with an increase in legal supply, desirable effects are always 
achieved on both illegal production and profits in the black market. This policy can be carried out only if a 
legal supply is feasible, which is considered to be another merit of allowing legal trade.  
 
Summary 
Our results suggest, in the context of biodiversity conservation, how a “sustainable use” policy, coupled 
with the lifting of trade bans, should be evaluated in terms of poaching when laundering is possible. The 
question of whether “sustainable use” policies aggravate poaching is under dispute (see, for example, 
Hutton and Webb (2003)). From our results, we see that a “sustainable use” policy can contribute to species 
conservation  
if the level of sustainable supply is large enough, but it may on the contrary accelerate species decline if the 
level is too small. Thus, a one-sided view of “sustainable use” policies is not appropriate. Whether the 
policy is beneficial or not depends on how much legal supply is feasible.  
 Apart from trade bans, legal supply seems to be a very useful instrument for authorities to wipe out illegal 
production, when the option of legal supply is available. If it is politically necessary for the authorities to 
strengthen the detection of illegal business, the policy mix can achieve this goal without raising illegal 
production.  
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